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Abstract
Adaptation to an environment consisting of two patches (each with differ-
ent optimal strategy) is investigated. The patches have independent density
regulation (’soft selection’). If the patches are similar enough and migra-
tion between them is strong, then evolution ends up with a generalist ESS.
If either the difference between the patches increases or migration weakens,
then the generalist strategy represents a branching singularity: The initially
monomorphic population first evolves towards the generalist strategy, there
it undergoes branching, and finally two specialist strategies form an evolu-
tionarily stable coalition. Further increasing the between-patch difference or
decreasing migration causes the generalist to lose its convergence stability as
well, and an initially monomorphic population evolves towards one of the spe-
cialists optimally adapted to one of the two patches. Bifurcation pattern of
the singularities is presented as a function of patch difference and migration
rate.
Connection to speciation theory is discussed. The transition from the
generalist ESS to the coexisting pair of specialist strategies is regarded as
a clonal prototype of parapatric (if the between-patch difference increases)
or allopatric (if the migration decreases) speciation. We conclude that the
geographic and the competitive speciation modes are not distinct classes.
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1 Introduction
The usual theoretical framework of thinking on biological evolution and, especially,
on speciation is population genetics. However, species are supposed to occupy dif-
ferent niches according to MacArthur & Levins (1967). The niche structure of the
environment implies frequency-dependent selection: The fitness of a strategy de-
pends on the presence of other strategies occupying some niches while leaving open
others. So a complete theory of speciation cannot be formulated in the context of
frequency-independent population genetics.
Unfortunately, frequency-dependent population genetics is hard and not well
understood. To explore the ecological conditions of speciation we neglect the com-
plications of the sexual reproduction. Competition between clonal strategies will be
investigated. This approach is usual in evolutionary ecology and game theory. It is
highly unprobable, that only a heterozygote can produce the optimal behaviour, as
Maynard-Smith (1982) argued. [See Hammerstein (1996) for mathematical elabora-
tion of the same reasoning.]
The concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) introduced by Maynard-
Smith & Price (1973), Maynard-Smith (1982) served as a starting point to explore
the realm of frequency-dependent selection. It was introduced in a game-theoretical
context, but has a more general meaning. Strategy x is an ESS, if it cannot be
invaded by any other strategy when established. Under frequency-dependent selec-
tion one cannot rely on fitness maximisation and the concept of ESS is supposed to
apply, instead. ESS was thought to be the fixed point of evolution: it stops as soon
as an ESS becomes established.
A serious problem was discovered concerning the stability of the ”Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy”, however. It is -by definition- stable against the invasion of a
new mutant of itself, but it is not necessarily an evolutionary attractor! Let the
strategy x0 be an ESS, and suppose that a nearby strategy x1, which is not an ESS,
has become established. If x0 was a stable fixed point in the sense of dynamical
systems, one would expect the population with strategy x1 to evolve to the strategy
x0 provided that x1 is near enough to x0. But this is far from sure. Actually, it turns
out, that these two kinds of stability properties are independent of each other. This
inequivalence was noted by Eshel (1983), Taylor (1989), Brown & Vincent (1987),
Vincent et al. (1993), Abrams et al. (1993) and Eshel (1996).
A general theory of the dynamics of adaptation was developed by Metz et al.
(1996), Geritz et al. (1997ab). [See also: Ferrie`re, R. & G.A. Fox (1995) and
Diekmann (to appear).] If an arbitrary strategy x is established, the population
experiences directional selection and evolves in the direction of the local fitness gra-
dient. The exceptions are the so called singular strategies, or the singular points of
the strategy space, where the directional selection force vanishes. One can classify
the singular points according to the different stability criteria including the evolu-
tionary and the convergence stability. The most interesting type of singular point is
the branching point. It is an attractor of the evolution of an initially monomorphic
population, but not an ESS as it was defined by Maynard-Smith. Once evolution
has reached this strategy, the population splits, then the two (or more) daughter
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populations evolve away from each other. This process is the speciation, at least in
an asexual population. The simplest source of this disruptive selection between the
daughter populations (species) is the selection for niche segregation: it is advanta-
geous to consume something else or to live in a different habitat than the rest of the
population. [Competitive speciation, Rosenzweig (1987).]
In the simplest ecological situation populations are living on, and limited by, a
finite number of resources. The number of coexisting populations cannot be higher
than the number of resources as it was pointed out by MacArthur & Levins (1964)
and Tilman (1982). (Relation between adaptive dynamics and partitioning of a
continuous resource distribution is beyond our topics.)
If only a single resource is present, the principle of competitive exclusion applies:
The single species which is best at exploiting this resource will survive. This is
the situation, when the classical ”optimisation” approach is applicable (Metz et
al., 1995). The single-resource situation is usually described as ”density-dependent
selection” (Michod, 1979, Pa´sztor, 1986, Mesze´na & Pa´sztor, 1990, Pa´sztor et al.,
1995,1996, Leon, 1995, Mylius & Diekmann, 1995).
Many authors emphasise the importance of spatial structure for speciation. Al-
lopatric speciation is initiated by a geographic change separating two habitats from
each other. In this paper the role of spatial structure and migration will be in-
vestigated in the simplest case when the environment consists of two patches. In-
dependent density regulation in the patches [soft selection, Christiansen (1975)]
corresponds to one limiting resource per patch. This two-resource situation limits
the number of coexisting populations to 2. It is clear that eventually two things can
happen in this model: either a single generalist occupies both of the patches, or two
specialist strategies occupy each a single patch. However, the bifurcation pattern of
the evolutionary dynamics is surprisingly complex in this simple model. Our model
is very similar to the one which was investigated by Brown & Pavlovic (1992).
General concepts of adaptive dynamics will be summarised in the next session,
while Section 3 deals with the model itself. Relevance of our toy-model for speciation
theory will be discussed in the last section.
2 General concepts of adaptive dynamics
As it is known since Malthus, populations tend to grow exponentially, just because
the number of birth and death events tend to be proportional to the number of
individuals present. More formally:
d
dt
N =M(E) ·N (1)
where N is the state vector of the population (number of individuals in different
age groups, etc., each element is non-negative). The projection matrix M(E) (e.g.
the Leslie matrix for simple age structured populations) contains the demographic
parameters (Caswell 1989, Metz et al., 1992) which depend on the state E of the
environment.
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Irreducibility of the matrix M is supposed. (For reducible problems one has to
deal with the component problems separately.) All of the non-diagonal elements are
transition rates, so they are non-negative. For such a matrix the leading eigenvalue
(the eigenvalue with the largest real part) is real, and the corresponding eigenvector
is positive, as one can demonstrate easily by the Frobenius theorem. The population
grows/decreases exponentially with the leading eigenvalue ̺(E) of the matrix M.
Obviously, exponential growth cannot be sustained forever. Every population has
to be regulated. If ̺(E) > 0, the growing population deteriorates the environment
until the leading eigenvalue becomes zero, and the population becomes stable - at
least in the simple case we consider in the following. [See Metz et al. (1996) for
a more general treatment, which includes chaotic dynamics as well as fluctuating
environment.]
Let us investigate the selection process within this framework. Let ̺ = ̺(x,E)
denote the growth rate of a strategy x in an environment E. (We will restrict our-
selves to the case where the strategy x is taken from a continuous, one dimensional
quantity.) If strategies x1, x2,...,xn are living together in the same environment,
demographic equilibrium requires
̺(xi,E) = 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., n (2)
These are n equations for the environmental variables. They can be satisfied
generically only if n ≤ K = dimE. The number of coexisting strategies cannot
be larger than the number of environmental variables involved in the population
regulation feedback. Concentrations of different resources are the most typical envi-
ronmental variables of such. Resource diversity is considered to be the main factor
behind species diversity (MacArthur & Levins, 1964). Other variables as preda-
tor densities may have a similar role according to Tilman (1982). Environmental
parameters, like temperature, humidity, etc., which are not involved in population
regulation because populations cannot ”deteriorate” them, must not be counted in
K. The bound K will be referred to as the dimension of the population regulation.
The situation is complicated further by spatial heterogeneity of the environment if
the local populations are regulated separately (Tilman, 1982).
Let Ex1,x2,...,xn stand for the environment when populations with strategies xi
(i = 1, 2, ..., n) are living in equilibrium, that is, for the solution of Eq. 2. If we are
interested in the fate of a new and rare mutant with strategy y, then the growth rate
of the mutant ̺(y,Ex1,x2,...xn) is the relevant quantity. It corresponds to the ’fitness
generating function’ of Brown & Vincent (1987) and Vincent et al. (1993). If it is
positive, the mutant can grow, otherwise it can’t. If it can, the mutant invades and
the system will reach a new equilibrium. We suppose that the new equilibrium is
reached before the arrival of the next mutant.
Let us first consider the situation where a single strategy x is established, that
is the case of a monomorphic population. The local fitness gradient
F (x) =
[
∂̺(y,Ex)
∂y
]
y=x
(3)
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drives the evolution of the strategy x. If F (x) > 0, a strategy x1 slightly higher than
x has a positive growth rate in the environmentEx. So, a new mutant with strategy
x1 > x will grow until deterioration of the environment stops it. If x1 is near enough
to x, one can safely suppose that the change in E will be small and, consequently, the
local fitness gradient does not change signs. This means that when x1 stops growing,
the original strategy x must experience a negative growth rate and therefore dies
out soon. That is, the strategy x will be substituted by a slightly higher mutant
strategy x1, if F (x) > 0. Similarly, if F (x) < 0, x will be substituted by some
strategy x1 < x. Evolution proceeds in the direction of the local fitness gradient,
while the population remains homogeneous. Dieckmann & Law (1996) discusses
the theory of this ”trait substitution process” in detail, especially the condition of
approximating it by a deterministic dynamics of directional evolution.
If F (x0) = 0, x0 is a fixed point of the directional evolution. Such a strategy
will be referred to as a singular strategy or singular point of the strategy space. A
singular strategy is an attractor of the trait substitution process if, and only if the
local fitness gradient points towards to the singular point from both directions, that
is[
dF (y)
dy
]
y=x0
=
[
∂2̺(y,Ex0)
∂y2
]
y=x0
+
[
∂Ex
∂x
]
x=x0
·
[
∂2̺(y,E)
∂y∂E
]
y=x0 , E=Ex0
< 0. (4)
(See Fig. 1.) This property of the singular point will be referred as ”convergence
stability”. A singular point which is convergence unstable cannot be approached by
small evolutionary steps. Such a strategy will be referred to as a repellor.
F>0 F<0
x0
strategy
Figure 1: Convergence stable singular strategy. Arrows show the local fitness gradi-
ent.
A singular strategy is a (local) ESS, that is, it cannot be invaded by a new, rare
mutant similar to itself, if it is a local optimum of the fitness:
[
∂2̺(y,Ex0)
∂y2
]
y=x0
< 0 (5)
Conditions (4) and (5) would be equivalent, if the environment was independent of
the population living in it.
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Singular strategies that are convergence as well as evolutionarily stable are the
real traps of the evolutionary process. [Such fixed points were called ‘continuously
stable’ by Eshel (1983). Note, that Brown & Vincent (1987) and Vincent et al.
(1993) used the term ‘ESS’ in a sense even stronger than the continuous stability.]
Directional evolution of a homogenous population approaches such a strategy, but
after reaching it, further mutations are doomed to fail. If a convergence stable
singular point happens to be evolutionarily unstable, something more interesting
happens. To understand this, we have to study first the situation in which two
similar strategies coexist.
x0x1 x2
strategy
growth
rate
local
fitness
gradient
x0x1 x2
strategy
growth
rate
local
fitness
gradient
ba
Figure 2: Coexistence of two similar strategies. Arrows show the local fitness gradient
felt by the coexisting strategies. a: diverging evolution near to a local minimum; b:
converging evolution near to a local maximum.
If two (similar enough) strategies x1 and x2 coexist in the environmentEx1,x2, the
requirement ̺(x1,Ex1,x2) = ̺(x2,Ex1,x2) = 0 implies that x1 and x2 must lie on the
opposite sides of a local minimum or maximum of the function ̺(x,Ex1,x2) except in
the non-generic case in which ̺(x) is constant. As it is clear from Fig. 2, the local
fitness gradient will drive the strategies x1 and x2 away from each other in the first
case (Fig. 2a), and towards each other in the second case (Fig. 2b). However, a local
fitness maximum is equivalent to the ESS property. Two coexisting populations near
to an ESS will converge and, eventually, form a homogenous population. [According
to Metz et al. (1996), one of them will die out, before the other reach the ESS, if the
stochastic nature of the process is taken into account.] Two coexisting populations
near to an evolutionarily unstable singular strategy experience disruptive selection
and evolve away from each other. This argumentation relies on the assumption
that ∂
2̺
∂y2
has the same sign when the singular strategy x0 is established as when the
strategy pair {x1, x2} is established. This assumption is justified when x1 and x2
are similar enough to x0, because in this case Ex0 ≈ Ex1,x2.
So, what will happen once an initially monomorphic population has reached a
small neighbourhood of an evolutionarily unstable singular strategy? The popula-
tion cannot evolve away from this strategy while remaining monomorphic and must
6
Figure 3: Evolutionary branching in the two-patch model defined in Section 3.1. Pa-
rameter values: d = 1.5, µ = 0.275. Evolution converges to the central (generalist)
strategy first. After branching coexistence of two generalist strategies is established.
become polymorphic. But as soon as two coexisting populations have replaced the
homogenous one, they begin to evolve away from each other! For this reason we call
the convergence stable but evolutionarily unstable singular points, branching points
(Fig. 3). [The term ‘evolutionarily stable fitness minimum’ was introduced for such
a point by Abrams et al. (1993) without realising the branching nature of it.]
After branching, each population evolves in the direction of its respective local
fitness gradient. Further branching can happen. The whole process is a dynamical
system in a space with a variable number of dimensions: each subpopulation present
is represented by a strategy parameter. The process stops if all of the populations
arrive to a convergence and evolutionarily stable (that is, a continuously stable)
singular point. Obviously, for each population the fitness gradient as well as the
properties of the singular points are affected by the presence of the other populations.
It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss polymorphic evolution in more detail.
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[See Metz et al. (1996), Vincent et al. (1993).]
Having more than one definition of stability complicates bifurcation picture.
Changing external parameters (parameters of the abiotic environment, for instance)
may change the evolutionary and/or convergence stability of a singular point. Change
of convergence stability is related to the bifurcation of the fixed points just like in
the fixed dimensional dynamics. Something similar happens in the variable dimen-
sional space if a singular point loses evolutionary stability. [See Geritz et al. (1997b)
for details.] We will refer to such transitions as ESS and convergence bifurcations,
respectively. The bifurcation structure of a specific model will be explored in Section
3. The evolutionary significance of the bifurcation diagrams will be the subject of
the Discussion.
3 The model
3.1 Definition of the model
migration
PATCH 1 PATCH 2
optimum:
x1
optimum:
x2
difference=x - x1 2
Figure 4: The model: two (different) patches with migration between them.
Competition between clonal strategies is investigated. The set of possible strategies
is a 1-dimensional continuum. There are two habitats (patches) (Fig. 4). The local
growth rate of a strategy in one of the patches is a given function of the strategy and
the patch density. Optimising selection and logistic, nonselective, density regulation
are supposed. The optimal strategies are different in the two patches. Individuals
migrate between the patches with a rate independent of the strategy. Time is
continuous, no population structure other than the patches is assumed.
The population abundance of the strategy x is characterised by the population
vector
N(x) =
(
N1(x)
N2(x)
)
(6)
8
where Ni(x) is the number of individuals of strategy x in patch i. The local growth
rate of the strategy x in the ith patch is
ri(x) =
1√
2π
e−(x−xi)
2/2 − αN toti (7)
where xi is the optimal strategy in the patch i while N
tot
i is the total number of
individuals in this patch. Let d denote the difference between the two optima.
Without losing generality we may assume that x1 = d/2, x2 = −d/2. Denoting the
migration rate by µ, the dynamics are described by Eq. 1 with the matrix M given
by:
M(x,E) =
(
r1(x)− µ µ
µ r2(x)− µ
)
. (8)
In this model the environment determining the growth rate of the populations is
characterised by the total densities in the patches: E = (N tot1 , N
tot
2 ). The population
state is described by the number of individuals of the different strategies in the
patches (Ni(x)), but the growth rates are affected through the total number of
individuals in the patches only. So, in our model the population regulation is two-
dimensional and one can be sure that at most 2 strategies can coexist. Intuitively,
there are two possibilities: a single species (the ”generalist”) exploits both patches,
or two coexisting strategies specialise on a single patch each.
Note the symmetry property of the model: it is invariant under the transforma-
tion x → −x. The central strategy x0 = (x1 + x2)/2 = 0 is obviously a singular
strategy where the local fitness gradient vanishes. It represents the compromise be-
tween the requirements of the two patches, so this strategy is the prime candidate
for being the generalist one.
We suppose, that the population dynamics converge to a unique stable fixed
point.
3.2 How can we analyse this model?
From (7) and (8) it is very easy to calculate the overall growth rate of a strategy in a
given environment, that is, when the patch densities N tot1 and N
tot
2 are known. (See
Section 3.3.) The result is intuitively very transparent. Determining the equilibrium
patch densities is much harder, however. For a single established population one
must solve the pair of quadratic equations (leading to a single cubic one) coming
from the equilibrium condition
M(N) ·N = 0 (9)
It can be done analytically, but not easily. We used the computer algebra package
MathematicaTM to solve this system of equations and to derive an analytic formula
for ̺(y,Ex). It is quite long, so we will not write it down here, but still useful, as will
be shown in Section 3.5. In this sense, the model can be fully analysed analytically.
Fortunately, because of the symmetry x → −x of the model, some central fea-
tures can be derived without computer algebra. If the established strategies are
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located symmetrically with respect to the central strategy x0 = 0, the total den-
sities of the two patches must be equal: N tot1 = N
tot
2 . (This is a consequence of
the assumption that the population dynamics has a unique, stable fixed point.) In
this case densities are trivial additive constants in (7) and (8) so they need not be
calculated.
Two different symmetric situations are possible. In one of them the central strat-
egy is the unique established strategy. Stability properties of the central strategy
will be discussed in Section 3.4 on this basis. The other symmetric situation in
which two strategies coexist, will be explored in Section 3.5.
3.3 The fitness of a rare strategy
The overall growth rate of the strategy y is the larger root of the eigenvalue-equation
det(M− ̺1) = 0. (10)
that is:
̺
(
y, (N tot1 , N
tot
2 )
)
= λ+ =
r1(y) + r2(y)
2
+
√√√√(r1(y)− r2(y)
2
)2
+ µ2 − µ. (11)
To get a feeling, it is worthwhile to calculate the two extremes of Eq. 11:
̺(y,E) =
{
max [r1(y), r2(y)]− µ, if µ≪ |r1(y)− r2(y)|/2
[r1(y) + r2(y)]/2, if µ≫ |r1(y)− r2(y)|/2 (12)
The matrix M becomes reducible at µ = 0 when the patches become separated.
In this case the growth rate of a strategy becomes equal to the local growth rate of
the patch in which the strategy happens to live. At very low, but nonzero migration
rate the strategy can manage to live in the patch better for it, so the maximum of
the local growth rates becomes the overall growth rate. At the other extreme, at
high migration rate, the difference between the patches is averaged out.
3.4 Behaviour of the central strategy
One can easily calculate the second partial derivative that determines the evolution-
ary stability of the central strategy:
∂2̺(y,Ex0)
∂y2
|y=x0 = (d2 − 4)
e−d
2/8
4
√
2π
+
1
µ
d2
8π
e−
d
2
4 . (13)
For high values of µ the second term is small so that the derivative is negative
(that is, x0 is an ESS) if, and only if, d < 2. A lower value of µ tends to make the
derivative positive even for low values of d. As it can be seen in Fig. 5, [low d, high
µ] is the only combination leading to evolutionary stability of the central/generalist
strategy.
If the migration rate is very high (top row of Fig. 5), ̺(y) is nearly equal to
[r1(y) + r2(y)]/2 (cf. Eq. 12), that is, the two patches are indistinguishable and the
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strategy feels an average environment. It does not imply, however, that the cen-
tral/generalist strategy is the superior one. The growth rate has a single maximum
at y = 0 if d < 2, and a double peak (with minimum at y = 0) if d > 2. In other
words, if the two patches are similar enough, the generalist strategy is evolution-
arily stable. However, by increasing the difference between the patches we make it
evolutionarily unstable, and a stable polymorphism of specialists emerges instead.
d= 1.5 mu= 0.05 d= 3. mu= 0.05
d= 1.5 mu= 0.6 d= 3. mu= 0.6
Figure 5: Fitness function when the central strategy is established at four combina-
tions of the parameters d and µ. Central strategy is an ESS, that is the fitness has a
local maximum at this point, if d is low enough and µ is high enough. In any other
cases the central strategy is a local minimum between two local maxima representing
specialist strategies.
Low migration rate leads to a different situation (bottom row of Fig. 5). ̺(y)
is nearly equal to max(r1(y), r2(y))− µ rather than [r1(y) + r2(y)]/2 except in the
vicinity of y = 0, where the curves r1(y) and r2(y) cross (cf. Eq. 12). Consequently,
̺(y) is double-peaked with a minimum at y = 0 even for low d. The strategy y tends
to live in the patch better for it. (Migration from the better patch is a net loss.)
It is more difficult to find the conditions for convergence stability, because the
term ∂
2̺
∂y∂E
· ∂Ex
∂x
, making the difference between the two kinds of stability, involves en-
vironmental (total density) parameters. A relatively long derivation (see Appendix)
leads to the result[
∂2̺
∂y∂E
]
y=0
·
[
∂Ex
∂x
]
x=0
=
∑
i
∂2̺
∂y∂N toti
· ∂N
tot
i
∂x
=
= − d
2
8µ
√
2π3
· e
−3d2/8
2µ + 1√
2π
· e−d2/8 < 0. (14)
The negative sign of this term ensures that condition (5) implies condition (4), that
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is, evolutionary stability is a stronger property than convergence stability in this
specific model.
Fig. 6 shows the parameter regions where the central strategy is stable in both
senses. The inverse migration rate 1
µ
was used instead of µ to stress the behaviour
at low migration rate.
0 5 10 15 20
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Repellor
ESS
Branching
inverse migration rate
Figure 6: Stability properties of the central strategy as a function of the parame-
ters. It loses the evolutionary stability and becomes a branching strategy if either
the migration rate decreases or the difference between the patches increases. Fur-
ther change in this direction causes loss of convergence stability making the central
strategy an evolutionary repellor. At very high migration rates the environment can
be regarded as homogeneous, so the evolutionary and the convergence stability con-
ditions coincide at very high µ.
3.5 Full behaviour of the model
What is happening when the central strategy is unstable, that is, if ̺(x,E0) has
a local minimum at the central strategy 0? The homogenous population with this
strategy branches and the daughter populations evolve away from each other. If the
two populations reach the two (symmetrical) maxima xmax1 and x
max
2 of ̺(x,E0),
evolution stops, because both populations sit in their respective fitness maxima.
(Note, that ̺(x,Exmax
1
,xmax
2
) = ̺(x,E0) + const. if xmax1 and x
max
2 are symmetrical.)
Fig. 7a shows the behaviour of the model as a function of the inverse migration
rate 1
µ
. (The parameter d was fixed at d = 1.5.) The central strategy x = 0 is an ESS
at high migration rate, a branching strategy at medium µ, and a repellor at low µ, as
it was discussed above. The three regimes are separated by two bifurcation points:
an ESS one at 1
µ
= 2.582 and a convergence one at 1
µ
= 4.226. The thick dimorphic
branches emerging at the ESS bifurcation point represent the evolutionarily stable
state of the dimorphic population as calculated from the local maxima of ̺(x,E0).
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Figure 7: Behaviour of the model. a: as a function of the inverse migration rate 1
µ
(d = 1.5); b: as a function of patch difference d (µ = 0.1). Vertical axis: strategy.
Dotted-dashed lines at x = ±d
2
represent the local optima in the patches. All other
lines represent singular strategies. Thin lines: monomorphic singular strategy; thick
line: dimorphic singular strategy; continuous lines: ESS; dashed: branching strategy;
dotted: repellor.
(Note that the two branches correspond to the two coexisting strategies, rather
than to two alternative states of the population!) The thin lines emerging at the
convergence bifurcation points are singular strategies (other than the central one)
of the monomorphic strategies.
The convergence bifurcation point separating the convergence stable (branch-
ing) and unstable (repellor) strategies is a pitchfork bifurcation of the monomorphic
adaptive dynamics. When the central strategy loses convergence stability, two new,
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convergence stable branches of fixed points (singular strategies) emerge. The popu-
lation evolves to one of them from the vicinity of the repelling central strategy. (All
of the singular points in the vicinity of this bifurcation are evolutionarily unstable.)
The stable branches were calculated by computer algebra using condition (2). They
cross the central strategy line at the convergence bifurcation point calculated in the
previous paragraph without using computer algebra. This nontrivial coincidence is
a useful check of the calculations.
The ESS bifurcation point separates the evolutionarily stable and unstable ( 1
µ
>
2.582 for d = 1.5) regimes. The central strategy is an attractor of the monomorphic
dynamics on both sides of this bifurcation point. This type of bifurcation is a
special phenomenon of adaptive dynamics: the number of dimensions of the state
space changes here. There is an apparent similarity between the ESS bifurcation
and the pitchfork bifurcation: two new stable branches (thick lines) emerge at the
ESS bifurcation point, as well. However, the two points on the two branches at a
given 1
µ
value together represent the stable fixed point of the dimorphic population
emerging from the branching.
There are two other ESS bifurcation points in the figure. The convergence stable
branches emerging at the convergence bifurcation point become evolutionarily stable
at very low migration rate ( 1
µ
> 10.97, extreme right side of the figure). No new
dimorphic branches emerge here, because the dimorphic branches emerging at the
ESS bifurcation point of the central strategy still exist at this very low migration
rate. So, what is happening at different migration rates? We have four regimes:
Case 1. At very high migration rate the situation is very simple. The highly migrat-
ing population is not affected by the difference between the patches. A monomorphic
population evolves to the central strategy and evolution stops here. An originally
dimorphic population becomes monomorphic and follows the central strategy, too.
Case 2. At a slightly lower migration rate a monomorphic population evolves to
the central strategy and branches there (Fig. 3). Daughter populations evolve to an
evolutionarily stable coalition.
Case 3. At even lower migration rate the central strategy is no longer an attractor
of the monomorphic evolution. Monomorphic evolution converges to one of the off-
central convergence stable singular strategies and branches there. Then the daughter
populations evolve to an evolutionarily stable coalition.
Case 4. At very low migration rate this off-central convergence stable strategy
becomes evolutionarily stable. Consequently, a monomorphic population evolves to
one of the off-central ESS points, and evolution stops there. A dimorphic equilibrium
is still possible, but unreachable from a monomorphic population by continuous
evolution except if it starts off exactly from the central strategy.
Note that some of the cases above are missing when d > 2, as it can be seen on
the phase plot Fig. 6.
The same story can be seen in Fig. 7b as a function of d at fixed migration rate
µ = 0.1.
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4 Discussion
The dynamics of monomorphic evolution is governed by the convergence stability
(instability) of the singular (fixed) points just like the stability properties of the
fixed points govern the dynamics of a constant-dimension system. A convergence
stable singular point is a stable fixed point of the monomorphic evolution, but not
necessarily of the whole evolutionary process. If it is evolutionarily unstable, evo-
lution proceeds further in the polymorphic portion of the evolutionary state space.
The number of coexisting strategies was limited to 2 by the mode of population
regulation, so further branching was not seen in this model.
It is very important to stress that the fact that evolutionary stability is a stronger
property than convergence stability is a peculiarity of this specific model. In other
models, ESS points which are convergence unstable can be found [see Kisdi &
Mesze´na (1993, 1994), Abrams (1993) for instance]. Such an ESS point is unreach-
able by small mutation steps. Even if it were reached, it would not be stable, because
the population would evolve away from this strategy following a small perturbation
in the environment.
Symmetry of the model was very important to keep the basic derivations simple.
Unfortunately, this symmetry made our toy-model less realistic. In an asymmetric
model one can expect that one of the daughter populations is more similar to the
ancestor than the other one. This behaviour would be more similar to the real life
where one new species is born and the old species does not necessarily die out. (Of
course, identity of species remains vague until introducing diploid genetics.) Prelim-
inary studies show that the bifurcation pattern reported here is altered considerably
by introducing asymmetry.
Brown & Pavlovic (1992) considered a very similar, although asymmetric, model.
They stressed already the role of migration rate on patch specialisation. Their local
growth rate function is different from (7). In their model, the generalist strategy
depends on the migration rate as a consequence of the asymmetry. In one of the
model versions of Brown & Pavlovic, the specialist strategies are constant because
of the specific form of the fitness function chosen. Unfortunately, they did not
consider the different kind of stabilities separately, so their results are not completely
comparable to ours.
Speciation is called sympatric if the new species coexists with its ancestor in the
same habitat. It is called allopatric if the new species occupies a separate habitat and
parapatric if the two species are living in different, but adjacent, habitats without
any migration barrier between them.
The allopatric mode of speciation is the most commonly accepted one. In this
case a geographic change (a new river or mountain range, for instance) divides
the population into two subpopulations, then the subpopulations evolve to their
respective evolutionary optima. A theoretical advantage of this speciation mode is
that it can be discussed without referring to frequency-dependent selection. If the
two habitats separated by the new barrier are different, optimising selection will
lead to different strategies in the two places. Emergence of reproductive isolation
is supposed to be a side-effect: if members of the two populations meet each other
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later, they will be too different already to breed successfully.
Sympatric speciation is regarded to be more problematic. It starts as genetic
polymorphism within a single diploid population. Reproductive isolation has to
emerge by selection. There are conflicting requirements here, at least within the
framework of frequency-independent population genetics. Genetic polymorphism is
maintained if the heterozygotes are superior, but selection for reproductive isolation
requires heterozygotes to be inferior.
However, there are definite examples of sympatric speciation. The species flocks
of the Cichlid fishes are obvious ones: a large number of species of monophyletic
origin are living together in different lakes in East Africa. The phenomenon was
explained along the lines of the allopatric theory by hypothesising that level-changes
divide the shallow Lake Victoria into smaller ones regularly [see, for instance, Skelton
(1993)]. However, a similar Cichlid flock can be found in the Lake Barombi Mbo
in Cameroon, which is a deep crater lake remaining connected even at large level-
changes (Schilewen, 1994)!
Population genetics tends to regard frequency-dependent selection as a compli-
cated, but, hopefully, rare special case. However, it is the normal situation in an
environment consisting of more than one resource, that is, with more than one niche.
The selection force depends on the availability of the different resources (niches),
which, in turn, depends on the presence or absence of other species. There is no
theoretical problem with sympatric speciation in such an environment. (We do not
expect speciation in an environment consisting of a single niche, anyway.) A popu-
lation experiences disruptive selection in a branching point. Disruptive selection can
maintain genetic polymorphism (Christiansen & Loeschcke, 1980, 1987) and selects
for reproductive isolation (Seger, 1985) at the same time.
So, spatial separation is not a necessary ingredient of speciation. There is
ample evidence of its role in evolution, however. [It is enough to mention the
Drosophilas in Hawaii (Skelton, 1993).] Explanation of allopatric speciation by
frequency-independent selection is far from satisfactory. It supposes the extreme
situation in which the geographic separation of the subpopulations is complete. We
demonstrated that complete isolation is not a requirement for separation-induced
speciation. If, by decreasing the migration rate, we cross the ESS bifurcation point,
the population, which was monomorphic so far, loses evolutionary stability and
branches. We regard this process as a clonal prototype of allopatric speciation. No
speciation occurs if the migration rate jumps from region 1 to region 4 immediately.
(Note that our approach is not applicable to the complete separation case because
of the loss of irreducibility.)
Losing evolutionary stability in the model, when d increases, is a clonal prototype
of parapatric speciation. No new migration barrier emerges in this case, but the
difference between the adjacent habitats becomes large enough to allow two different
species to exploit them. As in the former case, no speciation occurs if the change of
the environment is too large and too fast. The population then remains homogenous
and readapts to one of the habitats instead. Fig. 8 summarises the speciation modes
as represented in our model.
Working with clonal populations we could not incorporate emergence of repro-
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Figure 8: Speciation scenarios in the model.
ductive isolation into our model. We think that it can be done by the mechanism
introduced by Seger (1985). Our intention was to explore the ecological situation
making the speciation possible here and to proceed with detailed genetics later.
Note, that two of the three primary kingdoms of life (Woese, 1987) are clonal: of
the Bacteria, the Archebacteria and the Eucariotes, only the last group reproduces
sexually.
Rosenzweig (1978, 1995) introduced the term ‘competitive speciation’, empha-
sising the role of the ecology-generated disruptive selection in sympatric speciation.
It was contrasted with geographic (allopatric) speciation and polyploidy, when fac-
tors other than disruptive selection drives speciation. The model presented here
demonstrates, however, that geographic (allopatric and parapatric) speciation can
be competitive as well, because spatial structure can be a source of disruptive selec-
tion.
Note that the overall growth rate (11) is a strictly decreasing function of the
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migration rate µ. If the migration rate was an evolving parameter, this model
would end up with non-migrating specialists for each value of the parameter d. For
an evolutionary explanation of migration, one has to consider more complicated
models including environmental fluctuation.
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5 Appendix
The equilibrium conditions for a single strategy reads:
[R1(x)− αN1]N1 + µ[N2 −N1] = 0
[R2(x)− αN2]N2 + µ[N1 −N2] = 0. (15)
where Ri(x) =
1√
2π
e−(x−xi)
2/2. For the central strategy 0 the equilibrium densities
are
N1(0) = N2(0) = N =
R1(0)
α
. (16)
(R1(0) = R2(0) was used.) Using this result implicit function theorem leads to[
dN1
dx
]
x=0
=
R1(0)d/2α
R1(0) + 2µ
[
dN2
dx
]
x=0
= −
[
dN1
dx
]
x=0
(17)
From here, it is straightforward to derive (14).
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